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By Richard Newell
A lot of truly terrible houses have been built, apparently
inspired by architectural greats like Frank Lloyd Wright or
Mees Van der Rohe. But somehow the purity of the original thought
has been corrupted and bastardised by people without the wit
to appreciate it.
That lack of appreciation is a charge also levelled at financial
advisers, by two of New Zealand’s top finance academics,
Ed Vos, associate professor of finance at Waikato University
and Francis Milner, a corporate finance analyst with the BNZ.
Their original 2002 report, ‘The Theory and Practice
of Investment Advice in Financial Planning’ concluded
that advisers are not putting forward theoretically good advice
because they lack the ability to appreciate how to adjust portfolios
according to changes in the clients' risk tolerance. That is,
they do not think in terms of investing in the optimal 'market
portfolio' and matching this with 'risk free' holdings.
From the academic view, it is symptomatic of a lack of understanding
of the concept. Advisers though, don’t see it that way.
They believe the theory is just that, a theory, and that in
the real world, there are other ways of formulating asset allocation.
Generally, strategic asset allocation considers long term return
expectations for different asset classes, their risk characteristics
and correlation. The aspirations, well-being and risk tolerance
of the investor also play a role. The combination of the risk
asset and risk-free assets is the basis for the theory of efficient
portfolios. The father of modern portfolio theory, Harry Markowitz,
established the concept of the efficient portfolio; one that
maximises expected return while minimising risk. Taking into
account all the potential combinations of assets, it is possible
to determine which portfolios provide the greatest expected
return for a given level of risk. The efficient frontier is
then created by plotting all efficient portfolios on a single
graph.
James Tobin extended Markowitz’s thinking by introducing
the concept of risk-free assets. Tobin found that by introducing
a risk-free asset into the model, a single portfolio along
the efficient frontier could be established as the optimal
portfolio. This so-called ‘market portfolio’ was
embraced as the most appropriate basket of risk assets for
all investors, no matter what their level of risk tolerance.
The relative proportions of assets within the basket would
not change. What investors needed to determine was how much
they would invest at the risk-free rate and how much in the
market portfolio.
Vos and Milner explain: “Therefore, customising a portfolio
of assets to an individual client’s risk/return preference
is not a matter of changing assets or weightings within the
risky basket. It is a matter of choosing between the risk free
rate and market portfolio.” This equally applies to an
aggressive investor who wants to move further up the capital
market line from the market portfolio (higher expected return)
by borrowing to invest. “Any other choice does not optimise
the parameters of risk and return,” say Vos and Milner.
The process of formulating a client’s long term strategic
asset allocation is one of the most important, if not the most
important component of the whole advice process. If, as has
been suggested, asset allocation is responsible for 90% of
investment performance, why is the efficient portfolio theory
not taken more seriously?
Unfortunately, the theory has come under severe criticism over
the course of the recent bear market. Norman Stacey of Diversified
Investment Strategies, is just one of many advisers who do
not have much time for the academic viewpoint: “The efficient
portfolio theory has failed investors over the last three years.
It has not provided them with a way through the bear market
we have just been through. That is perhaps the issue for the
academics to address.
“The bear market has shown that it is market risk that
many clients and even advisers cannot handle. The volatile
conditions have scared off a lot of investors.”
Economist Donal Curtin also has issues with the efficient portfolio
theory. In particular, he questions the validity of adherence
to efficient portfolios based on false assumptions: “It’s
quite clear that the idea of a stable set of correlation coefficients
is simply wrong.”
“The pronounced drift between the asset classes is shown
by a study done in the United States, which illustrates that
between 1802 and 1870, you were paid 1.7% on average to hold
equities over bonds. In the period 1871 to 1925, the equity
premium was 3.9% and in the period 1926 to 1990, the differential
was 6.8%. As Curtin comments: “Over whatever period you
take it, you certainly don’t get numbers that would make
the efficient portfolio model reliable.”
Curtin believes that relying heavily on traditional strategic
asset allocation methods may not be appropriate for many clients. “This
is true over a variety of different time periods. If we look
at asset class performance over the last 11 years, property
is at the top and equities are at the bottom.” There
is still scope for using the principles of modern portfolio
theory, but Curtin’s view is that “it is possible
to structure an inefficient portfolio based on false assumptions.”
Vos has produced other research* that supports his view that: “low
and stable correlations are very possible. But care must be
taken as to the proper specific investment within a class.” He
defends his position by reiterating that his paper was attempting
to ascertain where advisers are failing to firstly understand
theory and secondly implement it: “The theory does not
say that they 'must find stable
low correlations' or that they cannot, from time to time, based
on their expert analysis of expected returns, co-variances,
and standard deviations, change their minds about what they
see as 'their best shot'. Everyone receiving their advice should
get the same opinion at the same time.
“So, the recommended mix of what is in the risky basket
of investments can, and will, change from time to time. But
the proportion of what is in that mix should not change as
the client's risk profile changes.”
One criticism levelled at the theory is that traditional beliefs
about diversification have not held up, that in the bear market
situation, all major markets are highly correlated. But Vos
says it is not correct to suggest that asset correlations are
all high in bear markets: “This is just another example
of people not being willing to undertake the necessary research
and analysis to create optimal portfolios.
“Planners seem to feel that the mathematics of diversification
are no longer valid. I can prove to you that diversification
reduces variability. If planners are not up to using the maths,
this is one thing. But if they reject the math as 'not valid'
this is quite wrong. My paper only suggests that they should
use the math and then come up with their 'best shot'.”
Clearly there is a credibility gap between the theory and the
practice. Strictly adhered to, the efficient portfolio model
should work and, as such, there is risk for the client in not
applying it. Do advisers have the tools at their disposal to
bridge this gap? In terms of asset allocation, they rely heavily
on their product suppliers. And in terms of risk assessment,
no they don’t have the tools. For many clients, the concept
of investment risk is something they have learned about the
hard way.
The problem of defining a client’s tolerance was illustrated
by a controlled study of risk assessment carried out by advisers
in Australia. It was shown that advisers’ estimates would
have been more accurate if they had made no attempt to understand
their clients’ risk tolerance, but had simply assumed
all were average. This is not a criticism of advisers. Other
studies involving managers and subordinates, doctors and patients,
teachers and students, etc. have shown similar inaccuracies
in assessing personal attributes. Where the industry has failed
is in not using the available knowledge to devise more effective
methods of investment risk assessment.
Donal Curtin encourages investment advisers to think outside
the box when formulating client asset allocation. “The
industry trend is to follow your favourite investment managers
of the moment, for example Wellington, or Alliance Capital
and just vary the weighting according to the client. A better
practice is to use different funds in different proportions
across different risk profiles, rather than the same fund manager
in different proportions for all levels of client.”
Not unnaturally, Curtin does not follow the advice of the academics: “No,
I am guilty on all counts there,” he says. “I am
prepared to make strategic shifts in asset allocation. And
as an economist, I like to think I have information that will
be some guide to the way things are going, so I’m prepared
to make the tactical calls. I am also happy to make changes
in style and to replace fund managers.”
Diversified Investment Strategies are also firmly in the active
asset allocation camp: “It adds value and reduces risk,” says
Stacey. He recognises the complexity of the issue and that
misinterpretation, or ‘shibboleths’ are apt to
confuse the issue. For example, the oft-quoted theory, originally
put forward by Brinson, Singer and Beebower, that over 90%
of the return of a portfolio could be explained by its asset
allocation. Brinson’s research indicated that 90% of
the variability of fund performance was due to asset allocation.
More recent research by Ibbotson Associates suggests the return
attributable to asset allocation is more like 40% for mutual
funds and 35% for pension funds. The remaining 60% of fund
performance variation results from such other factors as the
timing of moves between asset classes, security style (e.g.
value or growth stock), security selection and expenses.
The view put forward by Ed Vos is an idealized one, where advisers
are constantly monitoring the efficient frontier and the capital
asset pricing model in order the structure the most efficient
portfolio at that time. The advisers’ view is that they
don’t trust the theory and besides, they don’t
have time to seek out the optimal solutions.
There would appear to be some consensus here, that the complexity
of trying to aggregate various assets to come up with an optimal
risk/return profile is beyond the scope of most advisers. Vos
and Milner’s research confirms this and industry evidence
suggests that advice is proffered on the basis of a set menu
of investment options that can only approximate an optimal
portfolio.
Vos maintains that “the goal of an 'optimal' portfolio
using mathematics is still valid, and all clients should get
the same advice. This does not mean that the opinion of optimal
cannot change. Indeed, it should as more products become available
to enhance the 'optimal' performance.”
Published in ASSET Magazine, October 2003
Further reading:
Theory and Practice of Investment Advice in Financial Planning,
Ed Vos and Francis Milner, University of Auckland Business
Review, Vol 4, No.2 2002.
* Macroeconomic Drivers of the Non-correlation Between Equity
and Commodity Indices. Co Author: Frank Aarts. The Global Business
and Finance Research Conference. London, Vol 1 No 1, pp 380-393.
14-17 July.
Private Equity: A Portfolio Approach, Francis Milner and Ed
Vos. Journal of Alternative Investments. Vol 5 No 4, Spring
2003. pp 51-65.
Does Asset Allocation Policy Explain 40,90 or 100 per cent
of Performance? Roger Ibbotson and Paul Kaplan. www.ibbotson.com
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Copyright 2003-2009
Richard Newell. All rights reserved. |
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